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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) was the frontrunner for the establishment of the world’s first 
multinational emissions trading scheme (ETS). Committed to combating climate 
change, the EU sought to overcome the multilateral paralysis within the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to mitigate aviation emissions. Unsuccessful in 
pushing for a global market-based measure (MBM) within the organisation, the EU 
was ready for take-off to include the sector in the EU emissions trading system (EU 
ETS). The geographical scope, however, including all flights from and to Europe in 
their entire trajectory, caused frictions with the international community about 
sovereignty issues. Ultimately, Climate Commissioner Connie Hedegaard announced 
a ‘stop-the-clock’ for international flights, a temporary derogation until the 2013 
ICAO Assembly in order to find a global agreement.  
The ’stop-the-clock’ initiative provides ample opportunity to analyse EU leadership in 
curbing aviation emissions based on an analytical framework specifying different 
types of leadership. Its shows the global challenge to the EU’s claim of structural 
leadership on various levels in and beyond ICAO. The paper aims to analyse to what 
extent the EU is a global leader in mitigating aviation emissions and to identify the 
kind of EU leadership according to a threefold analytical framework. In addition, it 
will factor in the 'stop-the-clock' initiative and to what extent it altered the 
perception of EU leadership in the field.  
The paper comes to the conclusion that EU leadership in mitigating aviation 
emissions is not stalling. On the contrary, the EU, by pursuing the extension of the EU 
ETS, has put aviation emissions on everybody’s radar – and thus showed idea-based 
leadership. Proving the scheme’s feasibility further underlined EU leadership, in the 
form of directional leadership. The 'stop-the-clock' decision, however, already 
indicated what was later on confirmed in the 38th ICAO Assembly: Unilateral 
structural leadership of the EU in the field of aviation emissions is not credible at the 
moment. 
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Introduction: The ‘stop-the-clock’ decision of November 2012 
 
“In order create a positive atmosphere around these [ICAO] negotiations, I've just 
recommended […] that the EU ‘stops the clock’ when it comes to enforcement of 
the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS to and from non-European countries until after 
the ICAO General Assembly next autumn. But let me be very clear: if this exercise 
does not deliver – and I hope it does, then needless to say we are back to where we 
are today with the EU ETS. Automatically.”1 The statement of EU Commissioner for 
Climate Action Connie Hedegaard marked a turning point in the ongoing dispute 
about the mitigation of aviation emissions within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS).  Fierce global opposition, on both a legal and diplomatic level, preceded it. 
China, the United States and India were among the most vocal states, rejecting the 
EU ETS particularly because it was to cover, in their entirety, all flights to or from 
Europe, regardless of their origin. Moreover, developing countries claimed that the 
EU ETS did not respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
(CBDR), a centrepiece of the global climate change regime. Despite the global 
opposition, the EU decided to stay firm in its decision and pursued the inclusion of 
aviation into the EU ETS – until it stopped the clock in November 2012.  
The European Commission itself, Member States, media and academia all endorsed 
the notion of EU leadership in combating climate change.2 Yet, the announcement 
to stop the clock raised questions regarding the EU's leadership.  The aim of the ‘stop-
the-clock’ decision was “[t]o provide further momentum to the international 
discussions and continue EU leadership in this process”.3 Yet, in the light of recent 
developments, EU leadership in the field of combating aviation emissions should be 
re-assessed. This paper analyses the EU's leadership in climate change in the case of 
the inclusion of aviation emissions into the EU ETS. Is the EU after stopping the clock 
                                                 
1 European Commission, "Stopping the clock of ETS and aviation emissions following last 
week's ICAO Council", MEMO/12/854, Brussels, 12 November 2012. 
2 European Commission, "Climate change: European Commission sets out strategy to 
reinvigorate global action after Copenhagen", Brussels, 9 March 2010; R. Wurzel & J. Connelly, 
"Introduction: European Union political leadership in international climate change politics", in 
R. Wurzel & J. Connelly (eds.), The European Union as a Leader in International Climate 
Change Politics, Routledge, London, 2011, p. 13; C. Parker & C. Karlsson, "Climate Change 
and the European Union's Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?", Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2010, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 923-943. 
3 European Commission, "Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council derogating temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community", COM(2012) 697 final, Strasbourg, 20 November 2012 [emphasis added]. 
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still a global leader in this field? If so, what kind of leadership does the EU assume and 
how can the ‘stop-the-clock’ decision be read in that context? Given the global 
nature of civil aviation and the scope of the EU ETS, the analysis will emphasise the 
external perception of EU leadership. Special focus will be attached to the EU's 
credibility in its solutions, actions and in its threat to ‘restart’ the clock in case of no 
agreement in the ICAO Assembly.  
It is argued that, although the EU ETS has been heavily challenged, the EU remains a 
leader in the mitigation of aviation emissions: First, within the multilateral framework of 
ICAO the EU showed idea-based leadership when stressing the issue. Second, faced 
with a paralysed ICAO and no credible outlook for a global solution coming from 
within the organisation, it pursued the inclusion of aviation emissions into the EU ETS, 
thus showing directional leadership. Third, by defining a wide geographical scope for 
the EU ETS and against global opposition, the EU aimed for structural leadership. The 
decision to ‘stop-the-clock’ and the 38th ICAO Assembly, however, put things back 
into perspective and showed that the EU's structural leadership ambitions lack 
credibility, particularly from a global perspective. Moreover, I argue that the special 
nature of civil aviation causes further constraints to EU leadership. Developments in 
the field of aviation are driven by diverging preferences of actors, from protectionist 
to liberal governments, from state-owned to privatised and loss-making to 
expansionist airlines and a whole aviation value chain which includes, for example, 
aircraft producers. These differing agendas and interests make it hard for the EU to 
find common denominators for a global solution to mitigate aviation emissions. The 
progress in that respect suffers from contradictory principles of international law, 
namely the principle of CBDR, originating from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the principle of non-discrimination, 
firmly rooted in ICAO. The interest of not creating a precedent over these principles 
paired with commercial interests of airlines has led to the strong opposition to the 
unilateral inclusion of aviation into the EU ETS.  
“Leadership can be defined as an asymmetrical relationship of influence in which 
one actor guides or directs the behavior of others toward a certain goal over a 
certain period of time.”4 The concept has been used and advanced by various 
                                                 
4 A. Underdal, "Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management", in I. William 
Zartman (ed.), International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of 
Complexity, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994, p. 178. 
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scholars and notwithstanding differing typologies, most conceptualisations are done 
in a similar, threefold way.5 This paper adopts the typology of Parker and Karlsson 
which uses structural, directional and idea-based leadership:6 
- Structural leadership is based on the availability of power resources, which allow 
for incentives or coercive action to be taken. It forces or stimulates other actors to 
act in the way the respective leader wishes. Both ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ require 
credibility, otherwise “a would-be leader’s [...] bid for structural leadership will be 
seriously attenuated”.7  
- Directional leadership denotes unilateral “leading by example”, proving thereby 
the feasibility of a given policy.8 This type of leadership is based on the 
attractiveness of a leader's model to other actors. Being the first-mover, the 
credibility of a directional leader will be assessed on the basis of his performance, 
making it crucial for success.9  
- Idea-based leadership includes “agenda-setting efforts”, “problem naming and 
framing and the promotion of particular policy solutions”.10 Credibility is equally 
important but in a different way as it “relies on the force of the better argument 
and the entrepreneurial skill to bring new information and solutions to the table”.11 
These three notions will form the analytical framework to assess the EU’s leadership in 
reducing aviation emissions. After defining the parameters to assess leadership for 
the purpose of this paper, the first part will focus on the evolution of EU leadership in 
the field of aviation and emissions trading. The second part will emphasise the global 
opposition against the EU ETS, differentiating between economically and politically 
motivated opposition and giving an overview of retaliatory measures against the EU. 
An outlook beyond the 38th ICAO Assembly that took place in September and 
October 2013 will be followed by a concluding part summarising the main findings of 
the paper. Before going into detail of leadership in mitigating aviation emissions, the 
following part provides an overview of the impact of aviation emissions on climate 
change.  
                                                 
5 M. Grubb & J. Gupta, "Leadership", in Michael Grubb & Joyeeta Gupta (eds.), Climate 
Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe?, London, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000, p. 18. 
6 Parker & Karlsson, op.cit., p. 927. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., p. 926. 
9 Ibid., p. 927. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p. 928. 
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The evolution of EU leadership in aviation emissions 
 
The notion of climate change scientifically and politically evolved in the 1980s, 
leading to the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
to improve the knowledge about it.12 David Lee from the University of Manchester 
shares the opinion that global climate change is caused by anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, of which 50% remain in the atmosphere for about 
30 years, 30% for hundreds and 20% for thousands of years.13 Aircraft pollute beyond 
the emission of CO2, account for 2-2.5% of global carbon emissions and contribute 
around 3.5-4.9% to climate change.14 The sector’s total impact on climate change 
might be between two and four times bigger than the one of carbon emissions 
only.15 This share is likely to increase with the steady growth rates of global 
commercial aviation, especially in emerging economies, such as India or China. 
Additionally, the number of commercial aircraft is projected to double by 2031.16 
Hence, emissions in the aviation sector are likely to continue to grow.17 
Such growth rates will offset efficiency gains of aviation and increase the impact on 
the climate in a business-as-usual projection. Despite self-imposed measures, there 
remains a considerable gap between the maximum combined effect of measures 
and the target of emission reduction.18 Two particularities of aviation emissions are to 
be pointed out, as they have a considerable effect on their mitigation. First, 62% of 
all aviation emissions are emitted on international flights and 52% in international 
airspace (outside of national airspaces).19 Second, due to long aircraft life cycles of 
around 25 to 35 years, there is no quick and easy technical solution available.20 
                                                 
12 J. Vogler, "The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and Climate Change", in C. Hill & M. 
Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011, 2nd edn., p. 360. 
13 D. Lee, "Aviation’s climate impacts and the gap between aviation emissions and 
international climate goals", presentation, Brussels, 24 April 2013. 
14 IPCC, Aviation and the Global Atmosphere, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 
p. 3; D. Lee et al., "Aviation and global climate change in the 21st century", Atmospheric 
Environment, no. 43, 2009, p. 3534. 
15 R. Wit et al., Giving wings to emission trading: Inclusion of aviation under the European 
emission trading system (ETS): design and impacts, Delft, CE, 2005, p. 1. 
16 Airbus, Global Market Forecast 2012-2031, Blagnac, 2012, p. 11. 
17 Wit et al., op.cit., p. 1.  
18 Dalton Research Institute, Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences, 
"Bridging the aviation CO2 emissions gap: why emissions trading is needed", Manchester 
Metropolitan University, 2013. 
19 Ibid. 
20 IPCC, op.cit., p. 224.  
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Aviation emissions from UNFCCC to ICAO 
Neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol covered transport emissions because of 
a political deadlock in the negotiations.21 However, Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol 
requests the respective UN specialised agencies, ICAO and the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO), to work towards emissions reductions in their fields.22 
Unlike its Member States, the EU only has observer status at ICAO which is regarded 
“unsuitable [...] given the weight and leadership [...] in aviation matters”.23 Hence, 
the EU’s role is limited to following the activities of ICAO through its representative in 
Montreal and to coordinating the positions of EU Members States.24 Without the right 
to fully participate in sessions, meetings and working groups and lacking access to all 
the documents, the EU is rather dependent on its Member States. On the other hand, 
there is a strong degree of coordination within the EU institutions, but also in the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the European regional equivalent to 
ICAO. This coordination takes place in joint working groups of ECAC and the 
European Commission, where the common positions are prepared. Once reached, 
they usually are entirely respected by the Member States.25 
ICAO’s efforts to curb emissions 
While climate change is not among the organisation’s core objectives, 
environmental standards have been adopted at ICAO, but the organisation’s 
actions “have not gone beyond ‘symbolic’” for a long time.26 Hence, the triennial 
ICAO Assemblies of 1998 and 2001 did not bring particular progress in climate 
change.  
                                                 
21 S. Oberthür, "The Climate Change Regime: Interaction with IACO, IMO, Burden-Sharing 
Agreement", in S. Oberthür & T. Gehring (eds.), International Interaction in Global 
Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies, 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 2006, p. 61. 
22 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
23 European Commission, "A critical perspective on ICAO: Contribution of the European 
Commission to the Airneth Seminar on 'The future of ICAO'", 24 October 2007, p. 5; Delegation 
of the European Union to the Holy See, to the Order of Malta and to the United Nations 
Organisation in Rome, "Work with FAO", retrieved 25 April 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
delegations/rome/eu_united_nations/work_with_fao. 
24 European Commission, Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, "Air: The European 
Union at ICAO", 16 April 2013. 
25 Interview with official 1, Ministry for Transport of an EU Member State, via telephone, 26 April 
2013. 
26 Oberthür, op.cit., pp. 60-61, 63, 66; K. Kulovesi, "Make your own special song, even if 
nobody else sings along: International aviation emissions and the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme", Climate Law, 2011, no. 2, p. 540. 
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At the 2004 Assembly, market-based measures were discussed intensively, yet the 
international community was divided: On the one hand, Russia opposed further 
efforts claiming insufficient scientific evidence and warned to act prematurely. 
Canada, Mexico and the US were concerned about cost effectiveness and the 
legal, political and economic implications but did not oppose voluntary agreements 
if they were based on reciprocity.27 African and Latin American countries sought 
respect for the principle of CBDR, and the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) urged countries not to pursue any unilateral steps.28 On the other hand, a 
common position of ECAC states, including all EU Member States, defended the 
need for MBMs to respect the ‘polluter-pays’ principle and the precautionary 
principle.29 While ultimately not adopting a global approach, ICAO Resolution A35/5 
“endorsed the incorporation of international aviation into states’ existing emissions 
trading systems”, thus providing the legal ground to include aviation into the EU ETS.30  
In 2007, ICAO set up a first working group on climate change.31 During the 2007 
Assembly, the EU's determination to work within ICAO was reiterated.32 Moreover, the 
EU working paper also stressed the inclination to tackle emissions while accommoda-
ting developing countries by providing “[t]echnological cooperation [and] technical 
assistance”.33 Despite establishing “aspirational goals” for fuel efficiency (+2% p.a.) 
and encouraging states to submit “Action Plans”, ICAO’s efforts came late and 
remained voluntary and stood as such in contrast to the legally binding 
commitments advocated by the EU.34  
                                                 
27 ICAO, Assembly, 35th Session, Report of the Executive Committee on Agenda Item 15: 
Environmental Protection, A35-WP/352, Montreal, 12 October 2004, p. 8. 
28 Ibid., p. 9. 
29 ICAO, Assembly, 35th Session, Report of the Executive Committee on Agenda Item 15: 
Environmental Protection, A35-WP/352, Montreal, 12 October 2004. 
30 European Commission Directorate-General for Climate Action, "Aviation and Emissions 
Trading: ICAO Council Briefing", 29 September 2011; ICAO, Consolidated statement of 
continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental protection, RES A35/5, 
Montreal, 8 October 2004, pp. I-37-I-38.  
31 D. Motaal, "Curbing CO2 emissions from aviation: Is the airline industry headed for defeat?", 
Climate Law, vol. 3, no. 1, 2012, p. 7. 
32 ICAO, A36-WP/198, Working Paper: The European Union's Commitment to Cooperation with 
the World Aviation Community, p. 1. 
33 Ibid., p. 7. 
34 Kulovesi, op.cit., pp. 540-541; European Commission, Directorate-General for Climate 
Action, op.cit. (Aviation and Emissions Trading), p. 18. 
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The EU ETS as alternative to a paralysed ICAO 
Guided by the notion of appropriateness, the EU decided the react to this deadlock. 
Already the 6th Community Environment Action Programme of 2002 had set the year 
2002 as a deadline for progress in ICAO and Resolution A/35/5 finally triggered 
action at the Union level.35 Yet, there were additional motivations at the time: for 
instance, the uncertainty whether the Kyoto commitments could be met without 
covering aviation, the public support for the fight against climate change, and the 
fact that the EU had a potential tool at hand – the new EU ETS which was launched 
in 2005.36  As this paper focuses on the extension of the EU ETS to the field of civil 
aviation, EU ETS will serve as an abbreviation of this extension and not for the 
emissions trading scheme in its entirety. 
In 2005 the Commission initiated a public consultation with individuals, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), industry representatives and interest groups 
from the aviation and other sectors as well as national ministries and aviation 
authorities.37 The policy objective to mitigate aviation emissions was overwhelmingly 
supported.38  
When organisations, such as NGOs, industry representatives or companies, were 
asked about the most suitable MBM to achieve this objective, they indicated aircraft 
fuel taxes as their preferred option, followed by the EU ETS, en-route charges or taxes 
on aircraft emissions, departure/arrival taxes and a value added tax on air 
transport.39 Moreover, additional non-MBMs, such as consumer awareness raising, air 
traffic management (ATM) and infrastructure improvement, research and 
development or more efficient flying techniques such as the continuous decent 
approach were discussed.40  
                                                 
35 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the 2697th Council Meeting: Environment, 
Brussels, 2 December 2005, p. 7; European Commission, Directorate-General for Climate 
Action, op.cit. (Aviation and Emissions Trading), p. 17.  
36 J. Barton, "Tackling Aviation Emissions: the Challenges ahead", Journal for European 
Environmental & Planning Law, vol. 3, no. 1, 2006, p. 318; J. Barton, "Including Aviation in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Prepare for Take-off", Journal for European Environmental & 
Planning Law, vol. 5, no. 2, 2008, p. 187. 
37 Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General Environment, "Reducing 
the Climate Change Impact of Aviation: Report on the Public Consultation March-May 2005", 
pp. 1-50. 
38 Ibid., pp. 3, 20. 
39 Ibid., p. 24. 
40 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Regarding the geographical scope of an MBM, 71.7% of the consulted organisations 
were in favour of covering both intra-EU traffic and flights to and from third 
countries.41 The positive aspects clearly outweighed the rather isolated assessment of 
possible political risks regarding the scope: “It was suggested that it could give a 
good example [...] and it would be ‘a mechanism for forcing the recalcitrant Annex I 
countries (US/Australia) to engage, whether they liked it or not’ into the concept of 
polluter pays.”42 
Another advantage of this scope was the perspective of maintaining a ‘level-
playing-field’.43 The warning about “significant political and legal obstacles” did not 
feature prominently in the report.44  Interestingly, the opinion considering the “EU to 
be strong enough to take action on its own” was underlined by referring to it both in 
the summary and in the body.45 Given that fuel taxes were opposed by the industry, 
emissions trading was supported by the United Kingdom (UK) and France as well as 
by representatives of the aviation value chain (airlines, manufacturers and airports), 
whereas NGOs “cautiously accepted” the compromise.46  
In order to take into account the nature of civil aviation, which considerably differed 
from the installations covered by the EU ETS, the Commission followed up the 
consultations and commissioned from CE Delft a study about technicalities, such as 
the type of emissions subject to the scheme, its geographical scope, administrative 
details, the level of the cap and the method of the allocation of allowances.47  
The geographical scope of the scheme was given paramount importance as it 
determines both the environmental impact and the degree to which third countries 
are affected.48 Regarding possible legal constraints, the study concluded “that 
international provisions such as the Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation of 1944 and bilateral agreements contain no obstacles to including 
aviation’s climate change impact in the EU ETS”.49 
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 24. 
42 Ibid., p. 38. 
43 Ibid., pp. 6, 17. 
44 Ibid., pp. 6, 39. 
45 Ibid., pp. 4, 17. 
46 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
47 Barton (Tackling), op.cit., p. 319. 
48 Ibid., p. 319. 
49 Ibid., p. 7. 
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On an economic level, the study showed that the proposed policy options would not 
have a large impact on the industry. Since all options covered all carriers regardless 
of their origin, an equal treatment was guaranteed, unlike in other sectors of the EU 
ETS. The overall negative effect on the whole sector – with calculations based on a 
significantly higher carbon price than is currently the case (€10-30) – was estimated 
to be between a minimum of 0.1% and a maximum of 1.4%.50  
The Aviation Directive 2008/101/EC 
Based on the findings of the CE Delft study, the European Commission published a 
Communication calling for the mitigation of aviation emissions.51 While reaffirming its 
support for a multilateral solution, the Commission also acknowledged that “it is not 
realistic to expect ICAO to take global decisions on uniform, specific measures to be 
implemented by all nations”, as developing countries refused binding agreements 
and the US did not assume responsibility.52 Developing countries might, however, 
“commit themselves to more demanding policies [if...] they see clear leadership from 
industrialised countries”.53 The European Council, the Council and the European 
Parliament welcomed this Communication and agreed that an extension of the EU 
ETS is the best strategy forward.54 The December 2005 Environment Council 
Conclusions “urged the Commission to urgently put forward a legislative proposal”.55 
Moreover, the Commission created an Aviation Working Group with stakeholders 
from EU Member States, aviation regulators, industry and civil society to prepare the 
extension of the EU ETS. Possible infractions of third countries’ sovereignty did not 
figure prominently in the minutes of the meetings, but the Commission was reminded 
to carefully re-assess the legal situation as “operators from third countries […] may 
seek to challenge the approach”.56 In late 2006, the Commission finally proposed a 
                                                 
50 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
51 Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Reducing the Climate Change Impact of Aviation", COM(2005) 
459 final, Brussels, 27 September 2005. 
52 Ibid., p. 5. 
53 Ibid. 
54 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels,15-16 December 2005; Council of the 
European Union, Conclusions of the 2697th Council Meeting: Environment, Brussels, 2 
December 2005; European Parliament, “Resolution of 4 July 2006 on Reducing the Climate 
Change Impact of Aviation”, Official Journal of the European Union, C303E, 13 December 
2006, pp. 119-123. 
55 Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General Environment, "European 
Climate Change Programme II Aviation Working Group: Final report", Brussels, April 2006, p. 1. 
56 Ibid., Annex 1, p. 8. 
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directive “to provide a model for aviation emissions trading that can be a point of 
reference in the EU's contacts with key international partners and to promote the 
development of similar systems worldwide”.57 This proposal was further altered in the 
legislative procedure and adopted as Directive 2008/101/EC in November 2008.58  
The geographical scope covered intra-EU flights as well as all arriving and departing 
flights. Corresponding to the existing EU ETS, the Directive covered CO2 emissions only 
and assigned the duties of compliance, monitoring and reporting to aircraft 
operators. The state of registration determined the administrative authority for the 
European operators, whereas the third countries’ operators were assigned authorities 
in the EU Member State they had the closest link to, by means of air service 
frequencies.59 The 2012 cap of 97% of the sector's average 2004-2006 emissions 
would be lowered to 95% from 2013 onwards and be subject to further review.60 The 
Directive further entailed an initial auctioning of 15% of allowances and a free 
allocation of 85% of a baseline year’s historic emissions, subject to a benchmark 
methodology.61 While the Directive endorsed the use of revenues created by the ETS 
for climate change efforts, a binding earmarking could not be agreed on.62 A 
contentious issue during the negotiations and a side battle regarding the 
“distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States”, resulted in revenues 
being independently allocated.63 The Directive also had an external dimension by 
reiterating the EU's support for a global regime and by enabling the use of Kyoto 
credits to surrender allowances. Finally, Article 25 provides the legal basis to exempt 
operators if their country of origin adopts equivalent measures.64 
                                                 
57 Commission of the European Communities, "Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community", COM(2006)818 final, Brussels, 20 December 2006, p. 3.  
58 For an overview of the evolution towards the final Directive see "Climate Crash in 
Strasbourg: An Industry in Denial", Corporate Europe Observatory, December 2008, pp. 15-17; 
European Parliament and the Council, "Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 19 November 2008", Official Journal of the European Union, L 8, 13 
January 2009,  p. 8. 
59 European Parliament and the Council (Directive 2008/101/EC), op.cit., pp. 7-13. 
60 Ibid.; Barton (Including), op.cit., p. 191. 
61 European Parliament and the Council (Directive 2008/101/EC), op.cit., pp. 8-9.  
62 European Parliament and the Council, "Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 19 November 2008", Official Journal of the European Union, L 8/9, 13 
January 2009, p. 9. 
63 Kulovesi, op.cit., p. 555. 
64 European Parliament and the Council (Directive 2008/101/EC), op.cit., pp. 4-6. 
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Expanding the ETS – enhancing leadership? 
As the inclusion of aviation has shown, the EU aimed for leadership, reiterated that in 
multiple documents and exercised it in various forms. The EU's actions were guided 
by the conviction that aviation, outpacing other sectors’ carbon emission growth 
and the second largest sector within the EU ETS, must be held accountable 
according to the ‘polluter-pays’ principle.65  
Within ICAO, the EU advocated a reduction of emissions and engaged in “problem 
definition, agenda setting, goal setting and promoting policy solutions”.66 
Unsuccessful in this regard, the EU shifted its idea-based leadership to the Union level. 
It entered a phase of consultations to first determine its preferred policy measure. 
After the decision to amend the EU ETS was taken, various designs were assessed in 
the CE Delft study. Hence, further characteristics of idea-based leadership such as 
“suggesting innovative solutions” can be identified.67 As a pioneer in establishing a 
substantial ETS, the EU deepened the global policy makers’ knowledge about the 
applicability of emissions trading for aviation while preparing the Directive. Moreover, 
as the consultation showed, the aviation industry shared the Commission’s opinion 
about the need to take action. Consciousness-raising as well as using knowledge, 
information and innovation in a convincing way are further attributes of idea-based 
leadership.68 Moreover, the EU ETS has built in innovations such as the standing 
commitment to a multilateral solution, the integration of emissions not covered by 
the Kyoto Protocol into a shared carbon market, or the possibility to exempt states 
provided they take equivalent measures. 
Yet, the credibility of idea-based leadership is dependent on ‘the force of the better 
argument’, which might have suffered in three respects.69 First, the absence of 
earmarking revenues gives the impression of a “de-facto tax” and thus undermines 
environmental innovation.70 Second, both NGOs and the aviation industry criticised 
EU regulators for not pursuing the creation of the Single European Sky (SES), which 
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would result in further emission (and fuel) savings.71 Having adopted the SES together 
with the ETS through a comprehensive approach would have probably benefitted 
the environmental integrity of the policy and the credibility of the EU’s idea-based 
leadership. Third, the assessment of different options regarding the geographical 
scope of the ETS seems based on predominantly environmental and legal 
considerations. A certain lack of analysis of the potential political impact of an ETS, 
which global actors perceive as an infringement of their sovereignty, seems to be on 
hand. Aviation is a global industry which still is very much rooted in bilateral air 
service agreements between states which the Commission considers to be ripe for 
modernisation in its communication on developing the EU’s external aviation policy 
of 2005.72 The follow-up Communication of 2012 even calls the structures of global 
aviation “archaic” in terms of ownership and control rules of airlines.73 Despite 
liberalisation, the governance and structure of international aviation remains largely 
oriented according to these traditional rules – causing a much higher political and 
diplomatic sensitivity than in other global industries.74  
Notwithstanding the legal situation, the political dimension of such an externalisation 
of the ETS apparently has not been addressed sufficiently to meet international 
concerns adequately with the ‘force of the better argument’. Both the 
environmental cause and international law might be with the EU, but idea-based 
leadership rests on “[b]uilding consensual knowledge [...] or convincing [others] to 
accept new solutions”.75 For that reason, a more thorough consideration of the 
implications regarding the sovereignty of third actors would have been 
advantageous for the EU’s credibility. In addition, establishing the first ETS for aviation 
emissions with the underlying conviction to create “a model for the use of emissions 
trading worldwide” demonstrated directional leadership.76 As a first mover, the EU 
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went beyond rhetorical commitments, underlined its seriousness to act and 
furthermore proved the technical feasibility. Moreover, the geographical scope of 
the ETS covers the operations of European airlines almost in their entirety which shows 
that the EU does not shy away from taking responsibility that might come at a cost 
for EU industry. Yet, this commitment also suffers from the absence of earmarking 
revenues as mentioned above.77 Additionally, due to the low carbon price caused 
by the economic and financial crisis, also the credibility of directional leadership 
might, as well, be challenged by doubtful environmental effectiveness. This could 
affect the attractiveness of the model for others.78  
Structural leadership stems from the fact that the EU ETS applies to carriers, regardless 
of their country of registration on the whole trajectory of flights to or from the EU. 
Hence, the EU aims to “alter the behaviour” of other actors in order to tackle a 
“collective problem” – the impact of aviation emissions on the climate.79 Scott and 
Rajamani argue that the Aviation Directive's design claims to alter the system 
boundaries of the global climate change regime.80 Without a global regime in 
place, the scheme provides possibilities for a global departure rule or equivalent 
measures. In case the departure state insufficiently regulates aviation emissions, the 
EU ETS automatically covers the entire flight to Europe. The Directive departs from a 
production-based approach to a new understanding of the system boundaries of 
the global regime. Moreover, the EU recognises measures taken by a third state as 
being equivalent – or not. Hence, the final decision “to determine what is to count as 
‘good enough’” remains in European hands.81 This could be perceived as a strong 
EU statement on global governance. Nevertheless, one also has to take into account 
the global nature of aviation that makes it difficult to regulate the sector differently. 
Limited to a national or regional level, an ETS would be detrimental to the global 
competitiveness of affected carriers and also fall short of the environmental goal.82 
The credibility of the EU's structural leadership is dependent on whether the threat or 
incentive is underpinned with actual power.83  
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Constraints to EU leadership: the global opposition against the EU ETS 
 
The extension of the EU ETS caused protests on various levels, by different actors and 
for different reasons. Therefore, this part will first analyse the opposition by aviation 
industry stakeholders before examining the opposition by governments at ICAO and 
beyond. 
Opposition on economic grounds 
Today’s airline industry has been defined as a “cyclical and marginal industry”, 
facing risks beyond its control such as global economic conditions, weather events 
or the regulatory environment and at the same time bound to meet the challenge of 
balancing large financial turnovers with small margins.84 Despite these 
circumstances, aviation is a very successful industry: it experiences annual growth 
rates of 5% and beyond since decades.85 This success, however, comes with the 
environmental price tag of continuously growing GHG emissions, of which CO2 
emissions were 78.3% above the 1990 levels in 2010.86 
The airline industry was once strictly a state-controlled sector. Since the 1980s, 
however, it has been subject to liberalisation, namely in the US and the EU. Yet, in 
many parts of the world traditional ownership structures prevail and many flag-
carriers are still entirely or by majority owned by states.87 These airlines do naturally 
have closer ties to their respective governments, which also results in higher 
accordance of the airline’s policies with the country's policies.88 Interest groups, such 
as most notably IATA, represent airlines on both global and regional levels.89 
Operating globally in international and sovereign airspace, aviation is dependent on 
regulations and traditionally maintains well-established and close links to the 
regulators.90 Regarding the regulatory environment, climate change policy is rather 
seen as a “further [...] threat to the airline industry”.91  
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Already the 2005 CE Delft study analysed the potential economic effects on 
competition, transport volume and competitiveness of EU airlines in comparison with 
non-EU ones. While the study is based on a very different carbon price, the main 
findings might still be relevant to understand the economic impact of the ETS. The 
enhancing of environmental efficiency will also increase the economic efficiency of 
airlines. Recognising that “there will clearly be winners and losers”, the report found 
that by gradually phasing in the ETS, possible shocks could be absorbed.92 Also, there 
were no findings about notable distortions linked to the competition of EU and non-
EU airlines since aviation – despite its international operations – is less prone to carbon 
leakage when compared to other sectors in the EU ETS. This can be explained by the 
geographical determinants of air transport services: “An increase in the cost of 
European flights will not lead a Frenchman with business in Denmark, say, to buy a 
ticket from Los Angeles to Washington instead.”93 
This finding was challenged by a 2010 case study of the economic impact on EU and 
non-EU countries, based on a comparison between Continental Airlines and 
Lufthansa.94 Both airlines are network airlines operating their services from hubs where 
they provide connections to many destinations, including long-haul ones, which 
serve as end points of the respective networks. Short-haul flights thereby feed into 
the more profitable long-haul services which usually use larger aircraft. Lufthansa's 
additional costs were estimated to be higher as it had to operate such a short-haul 
feeder network entirely under the scope of the EU ETS. As a general conclusion, the 
authors found that the EU ETS might lead to a competitive disadvantage of “all 
European network carriers competing with non-EU network carriers on markets for 
long-haul air services”.95 These findings were also used to explain why European 
airlines advocate a global framework that would prevent market distortions. Yet, the 
precise disadvantage remains difficult to quantify.96   
The EU ETS is not the only financial measure targeting commercial aviation, as 
multiple countries impose taxes or charges that are levied on operators. For 
example, since 1994 outbound flights leaving the UK are subject to the UK Air 
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Passenger Duty, being recently described as “the highest tax of its type in the world 
by some considerable margin”.97 Similar – but lower – departure taxes are currently 
levied in Germany, Austria, Greece, France, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium and 
outside of the EU in Australia, the US, or Canada amongst others.98 Additionally, the 
US imposes a fee of USD 13.40 for both international arrivals and departures directly 
to the passengers.99 India too levies a departure tax, which might be included in an 
airline's ticket price.100 However, having multiple fees in place which all claim to be 
environmental measures, an overlap of similar fees which claim to serve the purpose 
of environmental protection might undermine the credibility of the EU's leadership, as 
the EU ETS might seem to be just another financial burden. 
The industry’s position  
The global airline industry represented by IATA opposed the extension of the EU ETS 
and lobbied heavily against it, both within ICAO and through governments. These 
actions had, however, “surprisingly little success”.101 On the contrary, the seriousness 
of the European regulators caused the airline industry to intensify their efforts in 
reducing carbon emissions.102 At IATA, Lufthansa's four-pillar strategy103 was 
essentially adopted in 2009 and hereafter lobbied for.104 Besides the intention to help 
shaping the character of a future global regulatory framework and thus prevent 
unwanted scenarios, this move also created welcome publicity. The paramount 
importance for the industry thereby was to avoid a regulatory patchwork.105 
European airlines 
European airlines generally supported both efforts to reduce carbon emissions and 
marked-based measures as an instrument. Motaal suggests that “they had a 
somewhat different reference point in mind” compared to non-EU carriers, being 
conscious that their sector might end up as a “free-rider” within Europe with no 
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regulation in place regarding its carbon emissions.106 Regarding the extension of the 
EU ETS, British Airways stood out as “the only major airline involved in emissions 
trading” and lobbied for an inclusion of aviation into the scheme.107 This original 
engagement can be explained by a combination of a long-standing British debate 
about the impact of climate change and the interest of enhancing the industry's 
environmental profile to enable future growth, especially regarding the expansion of 
London-Heathrow.108 Pressured by Scandinavian civil societies, traditionally in favour 
of climate protection, also SAS pushed for additional efforts regarding emissions.109 
Most European airlines were able to live with this idea because the geographical 
scope of the ETS was not limited to intra-EU flights. Thus the competitive 
disadvantage compared to foreign airlines operating on routes to and from the EU 
was reduced.110 Moreover, a potentially distortive effect among EU carriers was 
decreased as an intra-EU scope favours EU carriers with more flights not covered by 
the ETS.111 Scheelhaase illustrates the latter by projecting that an intra-EU ETS would 
cover 97.5% of Ryanair flights but only 28% of Lufthansa flights.112  
During the stakeholder consultations prior to the Commission’s proposal, it also was 
the airlines’ main aim to avoid market distortions.113 Lufthansa, on the other hand, 
always argued for a different approach, putting technical progress, improvement of 
the infrastructure, operational measures and the creation of the Single European Sky 
at the centre of emissions reductions, whereas MBMs should come last.114 NGOs and 
regulators report that the airline was strongly advocating its cause, also with respect 
to Switzerland's participation in the scheme.115 Others, however, reject this claim as 
part of the normal dialogue between aviation industry and governments which 
regularly takes place. Moreover, having Switzerland outside the scope of the EU ETS 
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would not alter operations regarding the congested situation at Zürich-Kloten and 
the strict night-flight bans in place.116  
In addition to the impact of the global economic crisis, European airlines also started 
to experience retaliatory measures by opposing governments. For example, Russia 
renounced visas for crews and China did only reluctantly grant landing permits. 
During respective airline negotiations with non-EU authorities, the EU ETS was 
repeatedly stated as the reason for administrative burdens, and airlines were urged 
to stop this measure.117 
This rationale changed the general stance of the European industry on EU ETS. In an 
open letter Air Berlin, Air France, British Airways, Iberia, Lufthansa and Virgin Atlantic, 
together with the aircraft manufacturer Airbus, publicly called for a halt of the EU 
ETS.118 Besides criticising the “intolerable [situation] for the European aviation 
industry”, they reiterated the general support of emissions trading, when applied on 
a global level.119 Hence, all major network airlines are now in line with the official IATA 
position, pushing for a global solution in ICAO.120 Regional and Charter airlines as well 
as low-cost carriers have a different position and “reiterate their support for a 
European ETS, provided it applies to all flights”.121 Yet, further dividing lines exist 
according to airlines’ financial situations, with the general tendency that large 
airlines are able to invest more in new technologies and hence are leading in 
emission reduction activities.122 
Non-European airlines 
Global airlines did not welcome the EU ETS, because “it was an additional cost and 
airlines have one obsession that is to reduce cost”.123 Airlines, such as the Emirates, 
Korean Air or Singapore Airlines preferred a global regime to the EU ETS.124 South 
African Airways claimed a “more fair and transparent” scheme and protested 
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against the ‘extraterritorial’ scope of the EU ETS.125 In general, airlines formally 
complied with the scheme but continued to challenge it, and only eight Chinese 
and two Indian carriers did not fulfil their administrative duties.126 Although China and 
India are “fairly active” in explaining to their governments what is best for their 
industry, they remain under governmental control.127 Chinese and Indian opposition 
will, hence, be elaborated when analysing the political opposition below. 
US airlines responded to the adoption of the EU ETS in a very critical way.128 Fiercely 
fighting its geographical scope, US airlines denounced it as being a violation of 
sovereignty and of the Chicago Convention. The European Court of Justice, 
underlining the scheme’s legality, ultimately turned down a legal case prepared by 
Airlines for America (A4A), American Airlines, Continental and United Airlines.129 This 
legal defeat did not, however, keep the US airline industry from fighting the EU ETS, 
and A4A successively welcomed measures opposing the EU ETS.130 Despite viewing 
the scheme as a disguised tax and a “European attempt to govern the world”, US 
airlines have complied with all administrative requirements.131 
A low carbon price has contributed to calming the debate as the economic impact 
on airlines becomes less significant.132 However, the dispute shifted from an 
economic to a political conflict which became a matter of principle for states. Now 
the EU ETS is “seen as setting a precedent: it’s a sovereignty issue” – especially in 
states with a strong sensitivity regarding the principles of sovereignty and CBDR.133 
NGOs see that the airline industry, especially the US industry, is aware of that and 
condemn airlines for playing on the rift between these principles.134  
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Opposition on political grounds: sovereignty and CBDR 
The political opposition against the EU ETS, fuelled by commercial interests, is 
grounded on a confluence of various highly debated issues regarding sovereignty 
and extraterritoriality, unilateral measures to protect the environment and the 
principle of CBDR.  
As mentioned above, already the CE Delft study scrutinised potential friction points 
with the sovereignty of third countries and rejected it.135 It stated that the ETS scheme 
differed fundamentally from conventional regulatory acts, as it does not impose any 
rules on how to operate an aircraft.136 The EU ETS might incentivise a certain environ-
mentally friendly behaviour but does not intervene directly and extraterritorially.137 
Similarly, in her legal opinion Advocate General Kokott denied an infringement of 
sovereignty in the A4A case.138 The way carbon emissions are calculated, taking into 
account the whole trajectory of flights to or from Europe, does not stipulate a 
regulation beyond the European airspace. The Directive merely sets the method-
logy of calculating allowances and thus “does not contain any extraterritorial 
provisions”.139 Regarding the question whether the EU ETS is of a coercive nature, 
Kulovesi agrees with the Advocate General that the penalty for non-compliance 
with the Directive does not constitute such a measure.140 When flying within the 
scope of the scheme, operators are free to conduct their business in whatever way 
they wish: they can decide whether they surrender allowances or not, whether they 
fly efficient aircraft or not, the only condition being that they eventually might have 
to pay a penalty.141  
Contrary to the principle of non-discrimination that forms an integral part of the 
Chicago Convention, the principle of CBDR embodies a legal understanding alien to 
ICAO. Yet, the mandate of the Kyoto Protocol resulted in a spill-over of CBDR into the 
rather technical domain of ICAO.142 In other words, “[t]he Achilles heel of climate 
negotiations was transferred to ICAO”, where it paralysed further progress.143 The EU 
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ETS, while exempting operators falling short of a given threshold, generally rejects the 
notion of CBDR. The reason put forward is that while operators are subject to the 
scheme, they cannot be subject to CBDR, which exclusively applies to states.144 This 
notion caused Scott and Rajamani to criticise shortcomings regarding CBDR and to 
suggest amending the Aviation Directive in that respect.145 The equivalent measures 
clause should be differentiated according to whether a country is a developing 
country or not, with less demanding measures required for the latter. Moreover, the 
clause calls for a further differentiation among developing countries to reflect their 
varying capabilities. However, the authors further suggest taking a route-based 
approach rather than a nationality-based one.146 Hence, all flights from a 
developing country, regardless of the airline’s country of registration would count as 
a ‘developing-country-flight’. Such a differentiation would not discriminate against 
airlines on the basis of nationality and therefore be consistent with the Chicago 
Convention.147 Another proposed measure concerning CBDR is to earmark all 
revenues from developing country flights to finance a climate fund, which exclusively 
redistributes the money for projects in these countries.148 
While the legality of the EU ETS is given or at least plausibly defendable, political 
implications remain: states have never been keen on having another state telling 
them how emissions should be managed over their sovereign airspace.149 The legal 
argument that the EU ETS is actually not regulating does little to overcome this 
fundamental issue. Opposing states expressed their views within ICAO, in groupings 
of like-minded states and unilaterally, through retaliatory measures.  
Opposition at ICAO 
At the 37th ICAO Assembly in 2010, the EU ETS was one of the main issues. Opposing 
states such as China, South Africa or Russia but also the US, Canada or Mexico 
criticised the EU’s unilateral action and stressed the precondition of a global or 
mutual agreement on market-based measures. Developing countries furthermore 
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aimed to enhance the importance of CBDR in dealing with aviation emissions.150 This 
opposition persisted and was mirrored in the very outcome of the Assembly. In its 
very first substantive operative clause, the adopted Resolution A37-19 “[r]equests the 
Council to [...] ensure that ICAO exercise continuous leadership on environmental 
issues relating to international civil aviation, including GHG emissions”.151 Yet, this 
continuous leadership is not reflected in ambitious or binding targets. The “collective 
medium-term global aspirational goal of keeping the global net carbon emissions 
from international aviation from 2020 at the same level” essentially adopted IATA’s 
‘carbon-neutral growth’ approach.152 The following subclauses, however, stressed 
the importance of CBDR, referring to historical emissions and to the “maturity of 
aviation markets”.153 Most importantly, a de minimis threshold of 1% of total global air 
traffic was introduced, exempting operators from states whose share falls short of this 
1% from MBMs.154 Finally, it “strongly recommended” using revenues from an MBM to 
improve the environmental performance of aircraft engines and to assist developing 
countries.155 
The de minimis exemption “was essentially a caving-in by ICAO to the CBDR 
principle” and, if applied, would exempt countries such as Italy, New Zealand, Saudi 
Arabia, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa or Portugal from any MBM.156 Interestingly, a 
Commission press release sought to sell the Resolution as a “breakthrough”, 
underlining the EU’s “instrumental role in securing this agreement” and its leadership 
regarding the extension of the EU ETS.157  
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At ICAO, however, the EU Member States, together with the other ECAC states, 
formally placed reservations on the document.158 The aspirational goals were 
considered too weak, and the stipulation of a mutual agreement not deemed 
necessary as it was already mirrored in the Directive's openness to a multilateral 
agreement or bilateral exemptions via the equivalent measures clause. Finally, the 
EU and ECAC states objected the resolution's de minimis exemptions on the grounds 
of potential market distortions and an increased likelihood of carbon leakage. 
Contrary to the already incorporated de minimis provisions of the Directive, an 
application of A37/19 would exclude operators from more than 160 countries from 
an MBM.  
We can group the states according to their reaction at the 37th Assembly.159 
Essentially all states outside Europe opposed the unilateral path the EU was taking.160 
Also, the rupture between developing and developed states became apparent, 
with states such as Canada, the US, Australia or the UAE opposing the de minimis 
provisions. The developing countries, on the other hand, stressed the importance of 
the de minimis clauses and, moreover, requested further exemptions going beyond 
the ones already granted to developing countries. First references to retaliatory 
measures and ‘futile consequences’ appeared as strong signs that the EU leadership 
was being challenged.  
The ‘coalition of the unwilling’ 
The so-called ‘coalition of the unwilling’ is closely linked to the lawsuit of US airlines 
and to their pressure imposed on the US government when the legal defeat became 
apparent.161 Exemplary for the tight cooperation between the US government and 
US aviation industry is the fact that senior airline executives joined the US Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA). Sources also suggest that the FAA was the driving 
force and drafter of the ‘New Delhi Joint Declaration’ of unwilling states adopted 
shortly thereafter.162 Additionally, Chinese aviation officials threatened “counter-
measures […] triggering [a] ‘trade confrontation’, which none of us would like to 
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see”.163 In late September 2011, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, 
Egypt, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Paraguay, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, the USA and the UAE met in 
New Delhi and adopted the New Delhi Joint Declaration.164 The signatory states 
urged the EU to alter the scheme’s geographical scope and to collaborate with 
ICAO. All other ICAO Council Members, except for the European states, Australia, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Guatemala, Peru, Swaziland and Uganda, were 
among the signatories. Canada, for its part, attended the meeting but did not sign 
the declaration.165 Shortly after the legal opinion was published on 6 October 2011, 
the dispute heated up during the ICAO Council meeting, where the Delhi signatories, 
and all but the European members, Australia and Canada, co-sponsored a Council 
Decision entirely based on the ‘Delhi Declaration’.166 The European states formally 
placed a reservation to the “disappointing” Council Decision, which in their view was 
based on a misinterpretation of the Chicago Convention's provisions on 
sovereignty.167 They were joined by Australia and Canada, which, on the other hand, 
also reiterated their opposition to European unilateralism.168  
This Council meeting again showed the “unity of purpose in opposition to the 
unilateral imposition of the EU ETS on non-EU States and their operators”, to use the 
words of the US representative.169  
From opposition to retaliation  
In January 2012, the Delhi signatories reconvened in Moscow to adopt a 
declaration, tabling a basket of potential actions against the EU.170 These included: 
- Using existing or new state legislation, regulations, or other legal mechanism to 
prohibit airlines/aircraft operators of that state from participating in the EU ETS; 
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- Filing an application under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention for resolution 
of the dispute according to the ICAO Rules for the Settlement of Differences 
(Doc 7782/2); 
- Holding meetings with the EU carriers and/or aviation-related enterprises in 
their respective states and apprise them about the concerns arising out of the 
EU-ETS and the possibility of reciprocal measures that could be adopted by 
the state, which may adversely affect those airlines and/or entities. 
Mandating EU carriers to submit flight details and other data; 
- Assessing whether the EU ETS is consistent with the WTO Agreements and 
taking appropriate action; 
- Reviewing Bilateral Air Services Agreements, including Open Skies with 
individual EU Member States, and reconsidering the implementation or 
negotiation of the ‘Horizontal Agreement’ with the EU; 
- Suspending current and future discussions and/or negotiations to enhance 
operating rights for EU airlines/ aircraft operators; 
- Imposing additional levies/charges on EU carriers/ aircraft operators as a form 
of countermeasure. 
 
The signatories’ intention to ‘raise the stakes in the battle’ made a rather little 
impression on the European Commission as the Moscow Declaration was seen as a 
mere re-iteration of concerns already voiced before.171 However, China, India, Russia 
and the US took further action, regarding non-compliance with the EU ETS and 
retaliatory measures targeted to European airlines and industry. Russia threatened to 
violate an agreement regulating Siberian over flights and additionally denied visas to 
European airline crews.172 However, the Commission did not consider the latter 
uniquely as a reaction to the EU ETS but also as caused by a long-standing dispute 
between Finland and Russia.173 
Introduced in the summer of 2011, a law prohibiting US airlines to participate in the EU 
ETS was adopted in the House of Representatives. Besides criticising the scheme as a 
violation of the Chicago Convention and calling on the EU to work with ICAO, this bill 
also pointed out that the revenue from the ETS was not earmarked.174 During the 
Senate hearing Secretary of Transport Ray LaHood heavily criticised the EU ETS as 
violation of international law and attacked the way it was pursued by defining it as 
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being arbitrary and “a bad way to treat [...] friends”.175 During the Senate hearing, 
John Kerry, today US Secretary of State, commented that regarding climate change 
his country had been “procrastinating” and “foot-dragging” for decades.176 
However, it is worth noting that Kerry too did not agree with the way the EU handled 
the issue and considered it a violation of the Chicago Convention. According to him, 
the argument that the EU was “not bound by it, is absolutely ridiculous”.177 After this 
debate, the US Senate passed the final ETS prohibition bill of 7 December 2011 which 
gave flexibility to the US Secretary of Transportation to prohibit the participation of US 
airlines, in case such action was in the “public interest”, regarding consumers, 
operators and the potential impact on US foreign relations.178 A subsection, however, 
referred to the need to “conduct international negotiations to pursue a worldwide 
approach to address aircraft emissions”.179  
This US position did come as a surprise to many actors in the EU, which expected 
more support from the transatlantic partner.180 Within DG CLIMA the opposition was 
denounced as being “totally over-proportionate”, and Bill Hemmings, programme 
manager at the sustainable transport NGO ‘Transport & Environment’, said with 
respect to the US: “[a] monster has been created, and the US will regret that”, 
referring to the fact that the initial fierce US opposition, fuelled by A4A’s lobbying, 
actually animated China and India to resort to new and stronger forms of protest.181  
China, followed by India, formally prohibited their airlines to cooperate with the EU 
ETS, thus becoming the only non-compliant countries.182 Moreover, both countries 
impaired the operations of European airlines regarding landing permits. When airlines 
confronted the respective authorities of China and India, they were sent to lobby 
“their European governments” in order to stop the EU ETS.183 Moreover, China used its 
commercial leverage vis-à-vis Airbus in the dispute. Confirming that the decision to 
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cancel an order of 35 Airbus A330 wide-body aircraft was “influenced by the view of 
the [Chinese] government on the ETS”, the Chinese Ambassador to Belgium also 
pointed out a potential cancellation of ten Airbus A380 ordered by Hong Kong 
Airlines.184 This cancellation, however, might have not been a retaliatory measure but 
a commercial consequence of Hong Kong Airlines’ mismanaged growth strategy.185 
Also, the projected demand of aircraft in China and the duopolistic market for large 
civil aircraft make a Chinese boycott of Airbus highly unlikely as doing so would 
surrender the country to a Boeing monopoly.186 However, the threat was real in the 
sense that even the postponing of orders and a slight reduction of them compared 
to the American competitor has considerable effects on Airbus’ production and staff 
planning and consequently on the labour market of Airbus’ production sites.187 This 
provoked the above-mentioned reaction from Airbus that called for a truce and 
finally brought the Commission to a point where resistance against the global 
opposition could no longer be upheld. 
‘Stop-the-clock’: evaluation and outlook 
 
In view of the possibility of a trade war and of further deterioration of global aviation 
relations, the Commission finally proposed to ‘stop-the clock’, resorting to a measure 
suggested by the South African Minister of Tourism.188 Main European network airlines 
were already pushing and hoping for some kind of signal by the Commission to 
reconsider the EU ETS given the global opposition. Yet, when Commissioner 
Hedegaard finally announced the proposal, it still came as a surprise to some.189 
Others seemed to be better informed and knew already since the summer of 2012 
that the Commission was planning something and was merely waiting for the right 
moment to act.190 This right moment was the setting up of an ICAO High-Level Group 
in Climate Change (HGCC), the task of which was to resolve the most disputed 
matters regarding MBMs, namely the geographical scope, the requirement of a 
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mutual agreement, a potential framework agreement and CBDR.191  As this ‘stop-
the-clock’ initiative signifies a departure from the EU’s previous strategy to force or 
stimulate compliance with the EU’s approach to mitigate aviation emissions, it will 
now be analysed in the light of leadership.  
Is the ‘stop-the-clock’ initiative structural leadership? 
Unlike directional or idea-based leadership, structural leadership is based on the 
availability of power resources. This conceptualisation of leadership will be used to 
assess the initiative as it calls for an appraisal of the EU’s power resources. Structural 
leadership, according to Parker and Karlsson, rests upon the credible use of ‘carrots’ 
and ‘sticks’, whereas a lack of credibility would “seriously attenuate” structural 
leadership.192  
The ‘stop-the-clock’ decision might be seen as a combination of ‘carrots’ and 
‘sticks’ and, if credible, indeed, a sign of continued structural leadership. 
Commissioner Hedegaard announced the temporary derogation as an act of good 
will in light of significant progress within ICAO and a positive momentum for a global 
agreement. However, in case ICAO would not deliver in the 38th ICAO Assembly, the 
EU ETS would snap back to where it was before November 2012.193  
Yet, a closer look at the credibility of the positive momentum in ICAO which 
motivated the EU to take the ‘stop-the-clock’ initiative, shows that little progress was 
in fact evident. The HGCC met three times before the 38th ICAO Assembly took 
place in September and October 2013 and a spill-over of sovereignty issues into the 
HGCC impeded a constructive atmosphere.194 Among the members of the HGCC 
no consensus could be reached on the most crucial issues mentioned above, 
except for “[l]ittle progress” that was made regarding the principle of CBDR.195  
Instead of building upon real progress within ICAO, the Commission, forced to make 
a move, sought to use the creation of the HGCC in an attempt to overcome the 
impasse created by moving ahead with the inclusion of aviation into the EU ETS.196 
The real (and only reason) for doing so was intra-EU pressure, coming from the 
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Ministers of Airbus countries, who were alerted by the risk of losing jobs in the aircraft 
manufacturing industries.197  
Outlook: ICAO 2013 – and beyond  
Credibility is a key determinant in the assessment of the various forms of leadership 
according to Parker and Karlsson’s typology of idea-based (agenda setting, 
providing information and solutions), directional (leading by example) and structural 
(power-based) leadership.198  
This leads to the question of assessing the credibility of an automatic ‘snap back’ into 
the EU ETS. The official stance was that the derogation lasts until the 38th ICAO 
Assembly ended and not longer. At DG CLIMA preparations were, however, already 
made for any outcome.199 Also Member State officials were talking more openly 
about a possible extension of the 'stop-the-clock' prior to the ICAO Assembly and 
were rather worried by the hard line taken by the European Parliament regarding 
such an initiative.200 The airline industry, in general, expected an extension.201 Outside 
Europe, the general opinion was that the clock has stopped forever, at least for 
international flights within the EU ETS.202  
During the 38th ICAO Assembly, the EU faced opposition from the ‘coalition of the 
unwilling’, which managed to gain the support from the majority of states. 203 Yet, the 
Assembly committed itself to create a global MBM from 2020 onwards, which will be 
designed in detail during the upcoming 39th ICAO Assembly in 2016. The EU was not 
successful, however, in finding supportive language for the EU ETS to be applied as 
intended in the meantime. Regarding CBDR, the 38th ICAO Assembly re-affirmed the 
de minimis exemption and the fact that "different circumstances, respective 
capabilities and contribution of developing and developed States […] will determine 
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how each State may voluntarily contribute to achieving the global aspirational 
goals".204 
 
Hence, the EU’s structural leadership is dwindling; without followers, one cannot be a 
leader. Yet, one can argue that the EU successfully leads the block of ECAC states, 
which are altogether more than 40. Still, as climate change is the global problem per 
se, being a leader in Europe is not enough. For the moment, the EU is no structural 
leader in combating climate change, as the outcome of the 2013 ICAO Assembly 
proved: even though the EU drew a roadmap for a decision on a global MBM to be 
signed in 2016 and entering into force in 2020, the application of the EU ETS on 
international routes and aircraft from third countries was successfully torpedoed by 
the Assembly, with a “big blow to Europe’s prestige”.205 Regarding the future of the 
‘stop-the-clock’ decision, Hedegaard said that “progress was made overall and we 
will now factor this in when […] we decide on the way forward with the EU ETS”.'206 
On 16 October 2013, the Commission made a legislative proposal to reduce the 
geographical scope of the EU ETS for aviation to the EU and EEA airspace, yet 
including non-EU carriers.207 Non-EU states did not receive this proposal very well, and 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom appear to favour a full exemption of non-
EU airlines from a geographically reduced EU ETS due to political pressure by the US, 
China, India and Russia.208 It seems highly unlikely that the EU ETS will ‘snap back’, 
even in a ‘light’ version, as it would undermine the credibility of the EU’s structural 
leadership.  
This flawed structural leadership, however, does not undermine EU leadership in 
aviation emissions in general. The EU was able to show strong idea-based leadership 
by keeping the issue as high on ICAO’s agenda as never before, by setting a 
timeframe until the 38th ICAO Assembly, by naming the problem, by proposing a 
solution and continuing the efforts for the proposed regional EU ETS. Moreover, if the 
EU came up with innovative policy solutions, simultaneously taking into account 
sovereignty and CBDR, it would further improve the record. Finally, the inclusion of 
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aviation into the EU ETS, thereby proving the feasibility, has been a pioneering act 
and certainly an important step in the right direction. By continuing the ETS on an 
intra-EU level, the EU will further provide directional leadership and expertise to other 
states wishing to adopt such a scheme. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper scrutinised the EU’s leadership in mitigating aviation emissions in order to 
assess to what extent the EU is a leader in this field. The EU has shown long-standing 
idea-based leadership in ICAO by naming the problem and suggesting a policy 
solution, namely MBMs. Driven by aviation growth rates and the lack of progress in 
ICAO, the EU included the sector’s emissions into the EU ETS. Prior to that, the Union 
had made considerable efforts to make sure that the special nature of aviation is 
adequately reflected in the scheme’s design. Following the environmental rationale 
– and the support of the stakeholders heard during the consultation process – the 
geographical scope of the EU ETS was designed to cover not only all intra-EU flights 
but also all flights from and to Europe. Earmarking the revenues of the EU ETS to 
climate change purposes and realising the potential climate change benefits of a 
Single European Sky could have further enhanced the existing credibility of the EU’s 
idea-based leadership. By committing to a global MBM by 2020, however, the 38th 
ICAO Assembly adhered to the policy solution suggested and lobbied for by the EU. 
This underlines the EU's idea-based leadership in curbing aviation emissions. 
Also, the EU took on credible directional leadership when proving the technical 
feasibility of emissions trading in the field of air transport and moving ahead with the 
inclusion of the sector into the EU ETS. Official EU documents also give the impression 
that, by including aviation into the EU ETS, the EU aimed to provide a global role 
model for the mitigation of aviation emissions. A better functioning of the EU ETS in 
general could further enhance the existing credibility of the EU as a leader by 
example, given the plummeting of the EU’s carbon market due to the economic 
crisis since 2008. The future of the EU's directional leadership will also be measured 
according to the EU's continued commitment to mitigate aviation emissions after the 
38th ICAO Assembly.  
The EU's structural leadership was heavily challenged both for political and 
economic reasons. Unity in diversity best describes the coalition of actors, bringing 
together developed and developing states, and the global aviation industry in their 
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opposition to the EU ETS. Initial support from some European airlines for the inclusion 
of aviation into the EU ETS waned as these airlines faced retaliatory measures from 
China, Russia or India. The EU ETS dispute lead the aviation industry, however, to 
adopt a more favourable approach towards MBMs and actively push for a global 
solution in the run up to the 38th ICAO Assembly. 
When Commissioner Hedegaard announced to temporarily exempt international 
flights from compliance, the implicit threat to let the scheme ‘snap back’ was not 
considered credible, especially not beyond the borders of Europe. The failure to 
secure supportive language for the EU ETS during the 38th ICAO Assembly and the 
negative reaction to an EU ETS reduced to European airspace showed that the 
credibility of EU structural leadership suffered.  
Aviation emissions in general are a challenging field for the EU to aspire leadership, a 
minefield of interests, sensitive issues and national pride. For a long time ICAO 
showed little interest to respond to the challenge of aviation emissions, and the 
emergence of the global economic crisis just after the scheme had been adopted 
did not contribute to an easy solution. However, there is room and need for EU 
leadership, as the past record in aviation emissions has shown. The EU ETS dispute is 
not amounting to a decline of EU leadership, but it highlights the need to navigate 
differently through the bumpy skies of aviation diplomacy. The bid for structural 
leadership might be lost. Aviation emissions on the other hand – more than ever – are 
on the radar of every decision maker today. 
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